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by Walter Elkan
Growing unemployment in underdeveloped countries is rapidly
becoming a major concern. One ought to begin by documenting its
extent, but whilst its causes are beginning to be understood, and
policies advocated, its extent is very difficult to establish.
Is this simply because of the general paucity of statistics?
I suggest not. With the best will in the world it would be diff i-
cult to collect meaningful statistics because one of the
characteristics of underdevelopment is that "employed" and"unemployed"
are not yet discrete and mutually exclusive categories. If one
thinks of an unemployed person as someone who lacks the opportunity
for gainful occupation - say, in Nairobi or Kampala - then it makes
a difference whether he does or does not have the alternative
opportunity of farm work or other work in the rural areas. The
sense in which he is unemployed must vary according to his altern-
ative opportunities, and it is probably meaningless to express in
one statistic both types of unemployment, and at the same time
administratively impossible to distinguish between categories of
unemployed according to alternative opportunities.
Although there are difficulties of measurement, this is not to
deny that it has been getting more difficult to get a job, and for
two reasons. First, because the population has been increasing
more rapidly than total wage employment, and, secondly, because as
the competition for jobs increased those luc1r enough to have a job
have clung on to it, thus further reducing the number of vacancies.
If, as is widely reported, turnover has declined markedly, it
follows that the numbers who could obtain a job must also have
declined This poses several interesting sets of questions, of
which I want to examine two:
Why has the number of new jobs increased so slowly?
Would urban unemployment fall if urban employment
opportunities rose?
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Turning first to the question why the number of jobs has
increased so slowly, one must begin by noting that there has been
a fairly substantial average annual increase in GDP and an even
larger increase in non-agricultural output. All earlier experi-
ence of economic growth had led one to expeot a close association
between economic expansion and the expansion of employment oppor-
tunities. This was certainly Great Britain's experience in the
19th century. Employment opportunities increased at about the
sane rate as national income in the first half of the century, and
at about half that rate in the last five decades. That might
still have been insufficient to absorb the increase in population,
and growing unemployment may have been partly avoided by large
scale emigration.1 In East Africa and in other developing countries
the number of jobs has risen much more slowly than GDP or industrial
output, and, indeed, absolute expansion in employment appears to
have been slower than in Great Britain during the 19th century,
despite the much slower rate of population increase during the 19th
century.
What are the reasons? Is it an inevitable consequence - as
is often suggested - of the growing trend towards more capital
intensive technologies? Is t because developing countries really
have no choice but to use these technologies, because to use
obsolete machines is to court disaster in a competitive world, and
in any case may prove expensive if it turns out to be difficult
to obtain spare parts? Nany go further and argue t. at in the West
greater capital intensity has been both cause and effect of the high
real income of wage earners. It is said to be a cause becauso high
wages make employers look for ways of displacing expensive labour
by cheaper machines, and it is a consequence because the machines
enable labour to produce so much more. The argument then shifts
to underdeveloped countries where it is said that this technology,
refaecting the industrial countrIes' factor proportions, is the one
they should use because, if it maximizes output per worker in the
West, it must do so equally in the ldc's. If, as a result, the
growth of manufacturing creates little additional employment, this
is treated as part of the order of nature and shrugged off as one
1 B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical
Statistics, Cambridge University Press, 1962.
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of those unfortunate but inevitable concomitants of induetrial-
ization which, from all other points of view, surely bestows great
benefits. This line of reasoning is very appealing to those who
are reluctant to consider the possibility that what is here
attributed to well nigh immutable forces may, in fact, be suscep-
tible to modification by the adoption of appropriate government
policies. When one recalls that "industrial" employment still
accounts for less than 5 of total employment in Uganda, and even
in Kenya for only 11%, it must appear improbable that these techno-
logical developments can explain more than a small part of the
failure of total employment to rise.
The policies in question are those which encourage capital
intensive techniques by, for example, the provision of generous
investment allowances uncompensated by the equivalent of the
British Regional Employment Premium. In Uganda, firms can write
off 12 of capital expenditure. Another example is the failure
to protect firms who provide training from having other firms
benefit without cost. It must be obvious, as Michael Todaro has
pointed out in his stimulating Ph.D. dissertation,1 that part of the
reason for choosing a capital intensive techn±que'is that it
economizes in the need for skilled and supervisory employees who
may have to be trained by the firm, The returns to the cost of
this training will be compared with the returns to the cost of
buying more expensive machinery, and training costs are partly a
function of the number of years the trained person stays with the
firm, The greater the probability that they will be enticed away
by other firms, the more the likelihood that the firm will opt for
techniques that minimize the need for skilled and supervisory staff.
But Government can counter this influence by treating training as
an allowable expense for income tax purposes, or, better still,
paying for the cost cf training and financing it by a levy on
industry as a whole,
Most important in stemming the tide to labour saving techniques
are policies which will check increases in wages. Some may assert
that employment is not a function of the absolute level of wages,
but few would deny the effect of the rate of change of wages. If
Michael Paul Todaro, "Urban Employment Problenin Less Developed
Countries: An Analysis of Demand and Supply", Yale University
Ph.D., 1968,
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that is rapid it will almost certainly cause employers to economise
in the use of labour. In some situations that is no catastrophe,
as when inefficiencies of management are eliminated or people hold
on to their jobs longer and thus become more efficient - the
textbooks refer to this as "labour augmenting technical progress".
But the encouragement of the use of telephones instead of messengers,
washing machines instead of dhobie wallahs, and electric fans
instead of hand-operated punkhas, seems bizarre, especially in
countries which are trying to hold imports down. Nor do donors
of foreign aid help in the pursuit of sensible policies if they
insist upon confining their aid to the foreign exchange component
of projects. Who will pay unemployed people to build roads if
imported earthmoving equipment can be obtained free?
In sum, an answer to the question why the number of new jobs
has risen so slowly cannot be couched convincingly in terms of
technological inevitability alone, but must also refer to misguided
economic policies.
Turning now to the second question - Would urban unemployment
fall if employment opportunities rose more rapidly? - I must again
refer to a series of articles by Michael Todaro, which seem tome
to have shed new light on this question.1 Todaro points out, as
many had done before,2 that the steep gap between rural and urban
páy is in itself quite enough to explain migration to towns in
search of work. But he goes on to explain that this migration is
1
Michael P. Todaro with J. R. Harris, "Urban Unemployment in East
Africa: An Economic Analysis of Policy Alternatives", in
African Economic Review, December 1968;
Michael P. Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemploy-
ment in Less Developed Countries" in American Economic Review,
March 1969;
Michael P. Todaro with J. R. Harris, "Wages, Industrial Employment
and Labour Productivity in a Developing Economy: The Kenyan
Experience" in Eastern Africa Economic Review, June 1969.
2
Emil R. Rado, "Wages and Employment in Uganda" in East African
Institute of Social and Cultural Affairs, Problems of Economic
Development in East Africa, Contemporary African Monogiaphs No. 2,
Nairobi 1965,
Dharam P. Chai, "Incomes Policy in Kenya: Need, Criteria and
Machinery", East African Economic Review, June 1968.
1
Unpublished paper, 1970.
2
, H. Harbison, "Generation of Employment in Newly Developing
Countries" in James R. Sheffield (ed.) Education, Employment and
Rural Development, bc. cit., p. 183; also quoted by Todaro.
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not solely a function of pay differentials, but also partly a
function of the probability of finding a job. People are quite
realistic about the likelihood that they will not find a job at
once; they realize that they may have to wait, and how many go
depends in part on how long it may take to find one's first job.
That people measure their chances was also attested to by
Caroline Hutton: she noticed the relative absence of illiterates
and of people with no previous employment experience among the
unemployed who were interviewed by her in Kampala, and concluded
that "there was a fair degree of realistic knowledge in the rural
areas about the realities of the urban employment situation". 1
In other words, urban migration is in part a function of the
probability of finding a job, or of finding it in a given tine, and
that in turn depends on the existing level of unemployment and the
rate of job creation.
If this is accepted, there follows a depressing inference,
viz, that if, perhaps as a result of policy changes, the rate of
job creation increases, this will not reduce urban uneipployment,
because as soon as it becomes Imown that jobs have become easier
to get, the flow of migrants to the towns increases, thus repleni-
shing the "pool" of urban unemployed - and this without any
change in income differential between town and country. Some
evidence of this exists from Nairobi at the time of the 1964
Tripartite Agreement, under which private employers and the Govern-
ment agreed to increase their payrolls by 1 5% at once, on condition
that trade unions agreed to accept a wage moratorium. In the event,
the Government could not afford to increase its labour force, but
private employers did and "this acted like a magnet attracting new
workers into the urban labour market".2
Todaro concludes fron this that if one wants to reduce urban
unemployment it is no good trying to do so by the use of more
labour intensive methods of production in the towns. So long as
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the rural-urban pay differential is attractive to people in the
rural areas, urban unemployment cannot be reduced by providing
additional jobs. Consequently, in common with Guy Hunter and
many others, he opts for reducing the magnetic pull of towns by
making rural areas more attractive.
Without disagreeing about the desirability of rural regener-
ation, I wöuld argue that in addition it is a worthwhile endeavour
to increase urban employment, not because it will necessarily reduce
urban unemployment but simply because it would increase the choice
open to people. If more urban jobs can be created by the pursuit
of more appropriate economic policies, this is surely to be
preferred
